Current Demographics Suggest Future Energy Supplies Will Be Inadequate to Slow Human Population Growth by DeLong, John P. et al.
Current Demographics Suggest Future Energy Supplies
Will Be Inadequate to Slow Human Population Growth
John P. DeLong
1*, Oskar Burger
2, Marcus J. Hamilton
3,4
1Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America, 2Department of Biology, Stanford University,
Stanford, California, United States of America, 3Departments of Biology and Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, United States of
America, 4Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, New Mexico, United States of America
Abstract
Influential demographic projections suggest that the global human population will stabilize at about 9–10 billion people by
mid-century. These projections rest on two fundamental assumptions. The first is that the energy needed to fuel
development and the associated decline in fertility will keep pace with energy demand far into the future. The second is
that the demographic transition is irreversible such that once countries start down the path to lower fertility they cannot
reverse to higher fertility. Both of these assumptions are problematic and may have an effect on population projections.
Here we examine these assumptions explicitly. Specifically, given the theoretical and empirical relation between energy-use
and population growth rates, we ask how the availability of energy is likely to affect population growth through 2050. Using
a cross-country data set, we show that human population growth rates are negatively related to per-capita energy
consumption, with zero growth occurring at ,13 kW, suggesting that the global human population will stop growing only
if individuals have access to this amount of power. Further, we find that current projected future energy supply rates are far
below the supply needed to fuel a global demographic transition to zero growth, suggesting that the predicted leveling-off
of the global population by mid-century is unlikely to occur, in the absence of a transition to an alternative energy source.
Direct consideration of the energetic constraints underlying the demographic transition results in a qualitatively different
population projection than produced when the energetic constraints are ignored. We suggest that energetic constraints be
incorporated into future population projections.
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Introduction
Over human evolutionary history, the global human population
has grown from an initial small size to ,7 billion today. Recent
global population growth rates peaked in the 1950’s and 1960’s
but are now declining [1], and it is widely believed that the world’s
population size is approaching a steady-state. Demographic studies
suggest that we can expect a leveling-off of the human population
at about 9–10 billion by the middle of this century [2,3]. Such
projections are made by extrapolating recent trends in the
relationship between time and vital rates. The key phenomenon
invoked is the ‘‘demographic transition’’, which is the reduction in
fertility that follows the development-induced reduction in
mortality [4,5]. In essence, growth rates decline as a result of
economic development, which brings benefits that increase
lifespan and reduce infant mortality [6,7]. Stimulated by these
development benefits, fertility rates decline until they reach
replacement levels or lower.
Economic development requires energy [7–11]. An expanded,
energetic view of the demographic transition is that increasing
energy use yields increasing development, thus decreasing
mortality, and eventually decreasing fertility. Most projections
have assumed that energetic inputs are either irrelevant for the
demographic transition or that global energy supplies will be
sufficient to fuel the economic growth that underlies the
demographic transition [1,3]. Such assumptions should be
scrutinized for empirical reasons, but also because they contradict
basic ecological theory. We submit that understanding the
connection between energy and population growth in humans
has the potential to shed light on the mechanisms of population
regulation in the human species [12].
Energy-dependent population growth
Energy is related to population growth via its effects on birth,
death, and migration rates. When energy increases in supply, a
population may grow [13], but energy supply may be approx-
imately fixed over some time scales. This latter state is the basis for
much classic theory in ecology, which suggests that as a population
grows, per-capita access to energy declines, leading to declines in
birth rates and increases in death rates and ultimately to a steady-
state population size [14]. Indeed, recent studies show that
metabolic rates (i.e., rates of energy use) are directly linked to birth
and death rates [15]. The majority of biological populations
experience some level of density-dependent population growth
that is a function of intra-specific competition for available food
energy [16], although other factors, such as predation and abiotic
stressors, are also involved [17]. For our purposes here, we define
an ecological path to zero growth as that in which individuals
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equal death rates. This is the steady state that occurs in the classic
logistic model of population growth, for example.
Importantly, however, modern humans use a considerable
amount of energy in addition to that required to support their
biological metabolism [18]. This extra-metabolic energy use has
increased through time hand-in-hand with economic development
[19]. Extra-metabolic energy is fundamentally different from the
food energy that constrains the ecological path to zero growth, in
terms of how it is acquired, the amounts that are involved, and the
activities it fuels. Nonetheless, relaxing energetic constraints with
the addition of extra-metabolic energy to the biological energy
budget stimulates changes in energy allocation patterns, such that
increased energy use results in fewer offspring. The use of extra-
metabolic energy also increases survivorship [7], so it is possible
that a high-energy steady-state could arise if there is an
intersection of the curves relating energy use to fertility and
energy use to mortality. The industrial path to zero growth is the
trajectory in which the continued addition of extra-metabolic
energy to the total energy use of individuals drives birth rates and
death rates toward a steady state characterized by relatively large
amounts of per-capita energy use [20].
The demographic prediction of a stabilized global population by
mid-century rests on the ability of the global population to increase
per-capita energy use and follow the industrial path to zero
growth. Such a steady-state does not represent an ecological
carrying capacity. It is a state where individuals with access to
relatively large amounts of energy reproduce only at replacement
levels. In this paper we ask whether future energy supplies are
projected to be sufficient to allow the global population to follow
the industrial path to zero growth. We quantify the empirical
relationship between per-capita energy use and growth rate and
use this relation to assess how future energy scenarios may affect
the size of the human population through mid-century.
Results
The rate of population growth in humans is strongly and
negatively tied to per-capita energy use (Figure 1A; R
2=0.44).
Growth rate is zero at 13,131 W (95% confidence intervals,
10,590–21,150 W), meaning that under current conditions the
global population would stop growing if everyone had access to
,13 kW of energy, or over 150 times more than basal metabolic
rate [21]. A similar relationship is found for average energy use
and average growth rate through time (R
2=0.73). This pattern is
a direct result of the dependence of development on energy use,
and the dependence of fertility and mortality patterns on
development. Growth rates decline with per-capita energy use
because birth rates fall with per-capita energy use more quickly
than death rates (Figure 1B). The decline in growth rate with per-
capita energy use gives rise to an industrial path to zero-growth, as
described above, where individuals with access to abundant energy
have replacement fertility.
Our model shows how variation in future energy supplies may
affect the size of the future global population, given the empirical
relationship shown in Figure 1. Specifically, our model suggests that
future energy supplies will be insufficient to generate population
leveling by mid-century (Figure 2A,B). We considered four
alternative energetic projections, anchored by a concrete and
recently published assessment of all types of primary energy [11].
These four scenarios, which we refer to as optimistic, linear,
realistic, and pessimistic, all provide vastly insufficient amounts of
energy to guide the global population down the industrial path to
zero growth, given current empirical demographic data. The
optimistic energy scenario is a continuation of the accelerating rate
of energy use that has occurred over the last few decades, and
exceeds the projected energy supply of any published account, yet
even this amount of energy fails to bring global growth rates to zero.
In the four trajectories generated from the four energy
scenarios, we hold the division of energy use between developed
and developing countries constant at the current ratio of 85% to
15% of total energy supply used by developed and developing
countries, respectively. We relaxed this assumption and allowed
the distribution of energy to be proportional to population size,
such that the developing world, with 82% of the world’s
population in 2009 [3], used 82% of the world’s energy. Using
the optimistic energy scenario, this change produced a much
slower rate of growth, concurrent with the UN medium projection
until about 2025, at 8 billion people, at which point our trajectory
departs from the UN’s and continues to rise.
How much energy is actually needed to allow the global
population to follow the industrial path to zero growth? We
calculated this amount, which we refer to as the implicit energy
supply assumption of the UN medium projection, by breaking
down the projection by developed and developing countries and
determining the total energy supply needed to achieve the
projected growth rate. Through about 2016, all energy scenarios
suggest that there is an adequate global supply of energy to achieve
the UN medium growth rate (Figure 2A, pink line). After this time,
which is well before the predicted leveling of population size, the
global supply falls short of the amount needed to continue along
the UN medium projection.
TheimplicitUNassumptionsuggeststhattherewillbeanincrease
in energy supply that appears to have no precedent in history [22].
Furthermore, the UN medium projection requires that the
distribution of energy use between the developed and the developing
world shifts through time, from a starting point of about 85% used in
the developed world today, to nearly 75% used in the developing
world by 2050 (Figure 3). Thus, the UN medium projection requires
more energy than is predicted to be available, as well as for that
energy to be distributed much differently than it is distributed today.
Of course, the outcomes produced by our model are sensitive to
the precise relationship between per-capita energy use and growth
rate, but Figure 4 shows that our main result is robust to error in
estimating this relationship. Nevertheless, small changes in
parameter values can cause the population trajectory to deviate
from the observed historical trajectory, as a result of the
compound nature of population growth involving billions of
people. Matching growth from the model to the observed growth
from 1950–1990 required a minor adjustment in the intercept of
the model from 0.055 to 0.057 (Figure 2B, past growth, section 1).
Matching growth from the model to the observed growth from
1990–2007 required a similar adjustment from 0.055 to 0.051
(Figure 2B, past growth, section 2). These adjustments to
parameter c (see methods) are well within the 95% confidence
intervals of 0.049–0.062.
The negative relationship between energy use and growth rate
also generates a negative relationship between global energy
supplies and global population size at 2050, which is an unusual
reversal of the typical positive relationship between resource
supply and population size. This negative relationship is a unique
signature of the industrial path to zero growth (Figure 5) and
reinforces the idea that the industrial path to zero growth is one
where additional energy leads to lower growth rates.
Finally, the model indicates that population growth will occur in
both the developed and developing worlds, with the bulk occurring
in the developing world because of asymmetric access to energy
supplies (assuming that the developed world continues to use 85%
Energy and Population Growth
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balance of per-capita energy use between the developed and the
developing world. In 1950, per-capita energy use in the developed
and developing world was 2600 W and 230 W, respectively (9-fold
greater in the developed world). By 2007, the difference had grown
to 7200 W and 470 W (15-fold greater), and by 2050, in the
optimistic scenario, the imbalance is predicted to grow to
10,700 W and 470 W (22-fold greater). Continued population
growth, coupled with the imbalance in energy use among
developed and developing nations, sets the stage for continued
growth through much of the world through the long-term
suppression of per-capita energy use.
Figure 1. Relationship between demographic rates (2000–2005) and per-capita energy consumption for countries (2003). A. Growth
rate declines across countries, with an equilibrium at ,13,000 W. The solid line is a regression fit through the data (20.0058 ln(Epc)+0.0553; R
2=0.54),
and the dashed lines are drawn with 95% confidence intervals of the parameter estimates. B. Both mean birth rates and mean death rates decline
with per-capita energy consumption, but birth rates fall faster than death rates, generating the decline in growth rate observed in A. Fits are: birth
rate (R
2=0.67; equation is (20.0074 ln(Epc)+0.0775); death rate (R
2=0.19; equation is (20.0015 ln(Epc)+0.0202).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013206.g001
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All attempts to project the future size of the global human
population are subject to considerable, and unavoidable, uncer-
tainty [23]. For most projections, the bulk of this uncertainty
pertains to the rate and timing of the demographic transition.
However, there is also much uncertainty in future energy supplies,
andthisenergyisessentialtofuelingtheeconomicdevelopmentthat
results empirically in the demographic transition. It is therefore
essential to understand how energy use patterns affect the growth
Figure 2. Past and future global energy availability and population size. A. Four scenarios bracket the uncertainty in future energy
availability. A leveling of population at 9–10 b requires all people on the planet to have access to ,13 kW on average, given current demographics.
The quantity of energy needed to do this (pink line) is far outside any projection of future energy supplies. B. Projections of population growth given
the four energy scenarios in A. All energy scenarios are insufficient to raise global per-capita energy supplies to the level at which growth rates reach
zero, and therefore no stabilization of the population is seen. However, a lower trajectory (dashed yellow line) can be achieved by switching the
distribution of energy use from the current state, where developed countries use 85% of total energy, to an egalitarian state, where the distribution is
set by the proportion of people in the world by developmental status. Under this assumption, developed countries use 15% of the total energy
supply. In this trajectory, the optimistic energy supply scenario is used.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013206.g002
Energy and Population Growth
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 October 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | e13206andstructure ofthe global humanpopulation[1].Byexaminingthis
relationship explicitly, we have identified a major, unrealistic
assumption of previous population projections. Given the unequiv-
ocal relation between energy use and fertility, stabilizing the global
population by mid-century will require vastly more energy than is
currently projected to be available (Figure 2A, ‘‘Implicit UN
assumption’’). As the population grows, increasing amounts of
energy are needed to bring more and more people to demographic
equilibrium. Current average rates of energy use across the globe
are much lower than equilibrium levels of ,13 kW.
Demographic projections assume that the demographic transi-
tion is both inevitable and irreversible. We submit that both of
these assumptions are problematic. This is because the demo-
graphic transition requires substantial amounts of energy, and if
energy supplies decline, then growth rates will very likely rise. The
potential for reversal of the demographic transition follows directly
from conventional theory in population ecology and from the
empirical relation we show here between energy consumption and
fertility. In the event of such a reversal, growth rates will likely
follow the current growth rate – energy relation. It is also possible
that a new relation will emerge as time progresses [24].
The growth rate – per-capita energy use relation has developed
through recent human history as human societies have increased
access to finite pools of energy stored in the geosphere, namely fossil
fuels [18]. Not surprisingly, then, there are interesting historical and
culturalpatternsembeddedinthisrelationship.Some countrieswith
shared histories cluster, including Arabian peninsula oil-exporters
that have high growth rates for their energy use, and former Soviet
states in Eastern Europe that have low growth rates for their energy
use (Figure 1A). Some of this variation may have to do with recent
migrationpatternsand world energytrade networks,andwesuggest
that further evaluation of historical effects on these relations may
help us to better understand these patterns. We also point out that
the variation around the general relationship indicates that there is
scope for a reduction in the amount of energy needed to fuel the
demographic transition.
The drop in growth rate with increasing per-capita energy use
occurs because birth rates drop with energy use more quickly than
death rates. How energy use induces a decline in death rates is
fairly straightforward: energy is used to develop medical
knowledge and technology and produce and distribute medical
services [7], as well as support increased quantity and diversity of
food that improves the nutritional state of people. In contrast, how
the availability of extra-metabolic energy induces a change in birth
rates is less clear. One possible explanation is that increases in the
costs of raising children in more-developed countries forces the
reduction in offspring number due to the constraint imposed by
the time and energy available to allocate to total offspring number
[5,18,25]. Currently, it is unclear why the introduction of extra-
metabolic energy to the total energy budgets of industrial humans
alters their reproductive allocation patterns, which in natural-
fertility populations follow energy-based life history rules [26].
However, it is clear that understanding the energetic basis for
reproductive decisions in humans could substantially contribute to
our ability to affect future growth.
Today,itiswidelyassumed thattheglobalhumanpopulation will
follow an industrial path to zero growth [2,27,28]. Our results
suggest that the total quantity of energy will be insufficient to
Figure 3. Following the UN medium projection requires not only large energetic inputs, but a shift in the distribution of the energy,
from being dominated by developed countries (85%:15%) to being dominated by developing countries (25%:75%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013206.g003
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constraints on birth and death rates may come into play at some
point, but this would be very difficult to predict at this time.
Shortages of water, disease, or violent conflicts could all play a role
in limiting population size, or the population could become limited
by food [29] and begin, again, to follow an ecological path to zero
growth. Our analysis indicates that it is crucial to determine how
those limits will come into play, as we can only expect the global
human population to follow the industrial path to zero growth if
future energy supplies turn out to be much greater than currently
projected, and a greater balance among rich and poor nations in
access to energy is achieved.
In conclusion, by failing to consider the fundamental theoretical
and empirical relation between human reproduction and energy use,
current demographic predictions of human population growth over
the near future are at best questionable. Our analysis shows that by
considering these relations as rigorously as possible, using empirical
data and fundamental principles of ecological energetics, the global
human population is likely to continue growing, due to energetic
constraints that limit our ability follow the industrial path to zero
growth under any reasonable prediction of future energy availability.
Methods
Data
We extracted data on per-capita energy use, growth rate, and
crude birth and death rates from the World Resources Institute
(WRI) database on country-level demographics and energy use
[30], and we fit nonlinear models to the data to provide an
empirical connection between energy and growth to use in the
population model. Per-capita extra-metabolic energy use is defined
as the total annual energy use for a country divided by the
population size. The crude birth and death rate data from WRI
are used only to show the intersection of birth rates and death rates
at a unique value of per-capita energy use, illustrating why growth
rates decline with per-capita energy use and how a high-energy
zero-growth state exists for humans. Using the WRI data, we also
tested for a relationship between per-capita energy use and growth
rate through time, where growth rate was independently estimated
as the average annual percent change of that country at mid-year.
Data for Middle Eastern oil producing states were excluded as
outliers, as they uniformly have far higher growth rates for their
energy use, and this may be a function of the amount of energy
used at a national scale in oil development.
We produced four scenarios of future energy supply, E, that
bracket pessimistic to optimistic possibilities. For the ‘‘pessimistic’’
scenario we used an estimate of the future total primary energy
supply from [11], which predicts continued growth of primary
energy supplies followed by declines beginning after mid-century,
and is consistent with other estimates [31]. We suspect, however,
that this projection underestimates future renewable energy
supplies, as the demand for alternative sources of energy will be
quite large, spurring additional energy production. Therefore, the
‘‘realistic’’, ‘‘linear’’, and ‘‘optimistic’’ scenarios project larger
Figure 4. The effect of variation in the growth rate – Epc relation on projected population growth. The main relation is the same as in
Figure 1. Growth trajectories given for the optimistic energy scenario only, indicating that even with best-case energy availability, the error in the
growth rate – per-capita energy use relation is not large enough to include a leveling to 9–10 billion by mid-century.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013206.g004
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scenario represents increasing energy use consistent with recent
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Population model
In the model, changes in population size are given by rN, where
growth rate r=f(Epc). E is given by the future energy scenarios, and
Epc is calculated as E/N. The function f is given by the empirically








where a and c are fitted constants and b is the proportion of the
global E available to a group. We divided the global population
into the developed and the developing world because of the large
imbalance in energy use between them (85% of global energy use
in the developed world [30] and the large difference in population
size (e.g., 5.32 billion in the developing and 1.35 billion in the
developed in 2007 [30]. Thus, b is 0.85 in the developed world and
0.15 in the developing world. Global population sizes at year t are
given as the sum of the developed and developing worlds.
We applied the model to past and future trajectories of global
energy supply. Estimated energy use for the years 1950–2007 were
provided by [11]. The four future energy scenarios for the years
2007 to 2050 were used to produce four energy-dependent future
population trajectories. Initial conditions for 1950 were
E=2.5610
12 W [11], with population size in the developed
world=0.81 billion, and population size in the developing
world=1.72 billion [6]. The growth trajectories produced by the
model were sensitive to the value of c, and conformity to past
growth required slight alterations this parameter. The fitted value
of c was 0.055 (+/20.07), but a match to the growth pattern from
1950–1990 was achieved when c was set at 0.057. From 1990–
Figure 5. Inverse relationship between global energy supply in 2050 and global population size in 2050. This negative relationship is
the direct result of a negative relationship between growth rate and per-capita energy use that generates an industrial, as opposed to an ecological,
path to zero growth.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013206.g005
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For the years after 2007, the fitted value of c was used. To assess
the robustness of our overall conclusion from the model output, we
reran the model with the 95% confidence intervals for the
parameters. We obtained three curves using the optimistic future
energy scenario, which we show as providing a best-case scenario.
We calculated the future energy supply scenario implicitly
assumed by the UN medium population growth trajectory using
the following steps. We first broke the projection down into
developed and developing worlds, given the endpoints of 2009 and
2050. We fitted a linear growth curve to the developed country
growth curve and a quadratic function to the developing country
growth curve. Sums of these two curves provided a close
approximation to the UN medium projection. For each group,
we calculated the growth rate for each year by (Nt+12Nt)/Nt from
the smoothed function. Third, we solved the fitted equation in
Figure 1A for Epc, and used the calculated growth rate to estimate
Epc for each year. Finally, we multiplied Epc for each year by Nt to
produce E, the assumed global energy supply needed for the
developed and developing nations to follow their respective curves,
and then summed them to get the total global supply needed to
propel the global population along the industrial path to zero
growth. This procedure allowed us to compare the assumed global
energy supply with the predicted energy scenarios, as well as to
assess the assumed distribution of energy among developed and
developing nations.
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